

Ongoing Legacy of War, Mass Violence and Genocide: World Conflict Index, Recent Cases, Issues and Trends

by Dr. Christian P. Scherrer
Professor at Hiroshima Peace Institute

Introduction.....	1
Ethnicity is not a “Political Pathology”	2
Towards a Comprehensive Typology of Mass Violence	3
The 7 Core Types of Contemporary Conflict and Mass Violence—Explained	4
Genocide as the Worst Crime	7
Summary of Classification, Indexes and Trends in Contemporary Mass Violence	8
Short 7-Type Classification of Mass Violence.....	8
World Conflict Index (as PP)	8
The 7 Trends in Recent Contemporary Mass Violence	8

For basic **concepts and definitions** see at <http://www.intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/~hyoshida/2007/2007-1/070613.pdf>

Introduction

Compared to the tremendous increase of intrastate warfare and non-war types of mass violence such as genocide and mass murder, the Clausewitzean type of inter-state conflicts was in recent decades a rather exceptional phenomenon in numerical terms. However, the neo-colonial or neo-imperialist wars launched by Western powers, led by USA and UK, in the East and the Global South, formerly called Third World, were among the most deadliest conflicts (counted in millions of victims) since WW2, mainly those in Korea, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and in Iraq since 1991 until today. In the last ten years interstate conflicts only accounted for 11% of all conflicts.

In well over half of all contemporary conflicts, earlier almost two-thirds, the ethnic factor (e.g., ethnic nationalism) is the dominant or influential component. Such conflicts tend to be protracted, and several of them figure among the most deadly conflicts, as in the cases of Sudan (1956 until today), Congo (since 1998–2002, ongoing in four eastern areas), Angola (1975–2002, ongoing in Cabinda) or Burma (since 1947/48 until today).

A conflict becomes more *deadly* by violations of the laws of war and inter-national humanitarian law. This happens when a conflict goes beyond the fighting between combatants, thus when unarmed civilians are not just caught in the cross-fire but are targeted for slaughter and/or die of war-induced famines and diseases. It is not war but mass murder if civilians get sorted out into designated victims and bystanders / others. When innocent people get targeted deliberately, then we talk about crimes against humanity. If such crimes are intentionally targeting victims because of belonging to a national, ethnic, religious or racial group *as such* then the crime is called genocide. This is the deadliest type of mass violence. Large numbers of people are killed in short periods of time, usually under the smokescreen of war. And often masses of people die due to (criminal)

neglect by the international community—not just in Rwanda 1994, in Iraq since 1991¹ and Darfur/Sudan since 2003 but in many other places, in countries with names most people have never heard of.

The lacunae (gaps and mistakes) of global surveys on mass violence can be identified:

- War registers overlook certain categories of violence—often due to ignorance but also deliberately, due to ideological reasons.
- Most registers are constructing static entities instead of expressing the permanent mutation of conflicts in the real world. There are a few “pure types” of violence in the real world.
- Conflicts develop over time and may change in quality, with one component becoming dominant over the other(s).

Ethnic and national groups’ struggles for survival, rights, or recognition dominate contemporary warfare and mass violence to a large extent; this result in “anarchy” in the state system. In the so-called Third World or the Global South, a growing number of states cannot claim to command an effective monopoly of violence.² Civilized states act impartially, irrespective of race, gender and ethnicity in order to protect their citizens and their democratic institutions, whereby the monopoly of violence is never actually used against another state—not to talk about the own citizens—since it is the last resort. However, depending on criteria employed, many of today’s states are failed states and potentially become dangerous states (internal repression, war, genocidal policy). The latest example is Burma/Myanmar³ where the military regime is

¹ Iraq: Genocide by sanctions, imposed in August 1990, as well as aggression wars in 1991 (US-UK bombardments) and since March 2003 (full-scale illegal aggression war by US-UK et al and ongoing occupation).

² Proper command over the monopoly of violence is seen as part of the core of modern statehood.

³ The name is rejected by the manifold minorities in Burma. It means the land of the Burmans; these is the largest ethnic group of some 70 in total. Contrary to the claims of the military junta (formally since the 1960s), which is suppressing and attacking rebel minorities in a ruthless way, Burmans are not a majority, though there is a majority of Buddhists (including all Mon, some Karen, Shan-Tai and others). Since 2006, after failed negotiations for surrender, the junta wages

shooting protesters in many cities and wages the longest war (60 years) of all countries against its own citizens, mainly the ethnic minority nations, earlier the communist groups, and today again unarmed protesters such as Buddhist monks and students (as in 1988). Since 60 years the UN has taken no action.

Ethnicity is not a “Political Pathology”

Some state classes have sought to declare ethnicity a “political pathology.” Adopting this, modern sciences have erred considerably in regards to the present and future status of ethnicity. Much contrary to the prognoses of the political and social sciences in regard to the development of modern societies, ethnicity has lost none of its importance in recent decades. As a matter of fact, the importance of the ethnic dimension, and its politicization, has grown; it now influences issues of status and categorization in violent conflicts and disputes.

Different types of actors such as states, international corporations, liberation movements, migrants’ organizations, political parties, pressure groups, strategic groups, military leaders, and populists all seek to make political capital out of “ethnic identity.” Some actors deliberately try to influence and manipulate the ethnic identity set-up.

The term “ethnicity” describes a variety of forms of mobilization that ultimately relate to the autonomous existence of specifically ethnic forms of socialization which have been politicized. The formation of ethnic identity cannot be taken as a given; it is the result (not an inevitable one) of processes of interaction within an ethnos, between one ethnos and another, and between one ethnos or several and a state or several states; the latter is no exception; if an ethnic group is separated into different states or is larger than many state populations. Of these three areas of conflict, only the second, the interethnic, is generally taken into consideration—mostly in the form of supposedly “tribal” conflicts. In contrast, the

again a brutal war vs. the KNU-KNLA which operates from liberated areas in the Karen state, Mon state and Tavoy.

conflictual relationship between ethnic groups and the state/states is of much greater significance, esp. with the rise of ethno-nationalism in the South (as before in Europe) since the decolonization period.

Ethnic identity is based on a consciousness of cultural separateness or otherness, not an intrinsic reflection of objective cultural characteristics nor a matter of “free choice” but develops fast within a conflictual context.

After long avoidance of the term (and its reality), “ethnicity” has recently become a much-used byword. Reference to the supposedly ethnic character of a conflict often fulfills a purpose other than elucidation. Paradoxically, in many conflicts that are described as “ethnic” in the media, there is often nothing ethnic to be found. The intention, rather—as in report on the wars in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda—is to hamper the search for the real causes.

Reference to ethnicity does not simplify the search for the causes of conflict. Ethnicity is not an “explanatory factor” in armed conflicts, nor should it be pressed into service as one because other explanations fail. Often—as in the case of Yugoslavia—one can talk of a hybrid ethnicization of religious groups. The violent conflict in Kosovo 1998/99 was the first war in the region showing a ethnic component.

A definition of an **ethnic community** includes:

1. A historically generated or (re-)discovered community of people that largely reproduces itself.
2. A distinct name, which often simply signifies “person” / “people” in the group’s language.
3. A specific, heterogeneous culture, including, particularly, a distinct language.
4. A collective (ethnic) memory or historical remembrance, incl. community myths (myths of foundation, shared ancestry).
5. Solidarity between members of such a community generates a feeling of belonging.

The above explanations and definitions bear relevance since the “ethnic factor” became an important often unexplained element in contemporary mass violence.

Towards a Comprehensive Typology of Mass Violence

Practically all wars are nowadays intra-state wars. Since 1945 internal conflicts within the borderlines of a single state are by far more numerous than inter-state conflicts (international armed conflicts) between two or more states.

Distinguishing internal and external conflicts—even thought politically as well as analytically relevant—tends to become severely blurred (and somewhat invalid), for several reasons:

- (1) To associate high death tolls mainly with inter-state conflict is out of date. Since WW2 many intra-state conflicts were/are extremely deadly and have regional impacts. For instance the insurgency by *Lords Resistance Army* (LRA) in Northern Uganda also destabilized parts of Southern Sudan and North-eastern Congo and produced a huge refugee wave. Until the new Iraq war all **most deadly conflicts** (counted in millions of victims, were structurally **intra-state conflicts** but aided and enlarged from outside.
- (2) States are often providing critical support to intra-state actors. (E.g. in the case of the LRA’s brutal destabilization war, mentioned in 1. The humanitarian emergency was mainly fomented by the Khartoum regime as retaliation for Ugandan support to the (finally) victorious SPLA, after almost fifty years of war which took 4 million lives! It was the SPLA-led Southern Sudanese regional gov’t that initiated and moderated peace talks between LRA and Uganda.
- (3) Intra-state ethnic or ethnicized conflict are generally of longer or **very long duration**; such **protracted conflicts** can have vast **spill-over effects**; in the case of Sudan’s decade-old war in the south this had deep impacts on most of its neighbours. Examples are the deadly intra-state conflicts in Rwanda-Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Angola (UNITA), Burma / Myanmar, etc. Burma is the longest contemporary conflict, running for 60 years.
- (4) Spill-over effects are also characteristic for large-scale interstate wars, such as the one’s

in Indochina (until the mid 1970s), Afghanistan and Iraq today. The Iraq conflict is the currently by far most deadliest conflict world-wide, with an estimated death toll of over one million only since the March 2003 invasion.

It is therefore difficult to capture the essence of a certain conflict and create comprehensive types. This is necessary not only to understand global mass violence but also to structure possible responses.

Responses are most difficult if ethnicity is a main element. Depending from the given period of observation, in between over half to two-thirds of all contemporary conflicts the **ethnic factor** (ethnicity, sometimes ‘racial’ traits) is a dominant or influential component. **Ethnicity** is mostly negatively charged in political discourse.

Contrary to the prognoses of political and social sciences in regard to the development of modern societies, ethnicity has lost none of its importance in recent decades. On the contrary, the importance of the ethnic dimension has increased. Identification of the driving forces of ethnic nationalism in the global framework leads to questions linked with the nature of ethnicity and the ethnic base of nations. Underneath the structure of nearly 200 states there is an extraordinary multitude of distinct groups.

Whilst ethnic violence in the former USSR was a non-intentional result of Lenin’s policy of administrative ethnicization and autonomization (the *korenizatsiya*), the legacies of colonialism and other external conditions contributed in the Third World to separate nations from nationalities.

The invention of the **nation-state**, its official nationalism, and the false expectations created by development ideologies in the former colonies are some of the most virulent sources for past, current and future conflicts. The European nation-state project created large-scale disorder and mass violence, first in **Europe, the world’s most deadly killing field until 1945**, and then in much of the Third World, after having been exported to the colonies.

The **official nationalism** failed to satisfy its own aspirations of achieving an acceptable

degree of development. **State failure** to safeguard internal peace and security created most extreme problems.

The sacrosanct **principle of non-interference** in the internal affairs of states has always been a shaky rule as the high number of foreign state interventions shows: States of the North were since 1945 actively involved in over 390 wars fought by state actors in the South. Compilations concerning the period of 1945 to 1991 go as high as 690 foreign overt military interventions.

As for numbers of **war involvement by states**, the most war-addicted country was/is Britain, followed by its largest settler-colony, the U.S.A., and several of its colonies, mainly India, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, as well as Israel, another British creation (by the Balfour declaration).

As for **most deadly conflict-involvement**, Spain, Portugal, France, Japan and USA joined Britain (with the Spanish colonization and genocide against the indigenous Americans being the most deadly single episode of mass violence in human history, killing est. hundred million natives).

The term **internal conflict** tends to become invalid regarding a number of issues and threats that can no longer be considered as falling under the competence of the state. Additionally, globalization and multi-polarity—in all facets—have become fast expanding realities. Thus the scope of what are “internal affairs” of states has to be redrawn.

Deep changes in contemporary violent conflicts call for rethinking and adaptation of the basic concepts of peace, war, genocide and other mass violence in the 21st century.

The 7 Core Types of Contemporary Conflict and Mass Violence—Explained

- A. Anti-regime wars or political and ideological conflicts: State versus Insurrection (SvI). There are different forms: (1) liberation movements vs. colonial powers; (2) popular movements and/or sociorevolutionary movements vs. authoritarian states (e.g., Colombia’s long lasting intra-state conflict; (3) destabilization or reestablishing a status ante; this subtype tends to be the most deadly

- one within type A. The aim is either to replace the government of the day or to change/re-change the sociopolitical system. In some cases destabilization conflicts started in the framework of the Cold War drew foreign direct intervention, became very violent and have long duration; exemplary cases were RENAMO in Mozambique or UNITA in Angola, the Contras in Nicaragua (1979-90), Mujaheddin (until 1991) and Taliban in Afghanistan (until today, internationalized again by foreign military intervention of USA-NATO, which is seemingly unable to prevent the return of the Taliban ousted late in 2001). Some former destabilization conflicts have mutated to become dominantly ethno-nationalist or rather ethno-tribalist (e.g., Angola) or include religious extremism (e.g., Afghanistan).
- B. Ethnonationalist conflicts:** In diverse forms, mostly as intrastate conflicts opposing states and national groups (State versus Nation, SvN); sometimes as inter-state conflicts (MSvN). Ethnonationalist SvN conflicts are the most frequent type of contemporary armed conflicts and wars; such conflicts are generally of long duration (often measured in decades, with Burma/Myanmar holding the record with 60 years of intrastate warfare and slaughter vs. manifold minorities, followed by Sudan's manifold conflicts)—even though conflict resolution would only in a few cases afford to create new states. The aim is self-defence; in extreme cases as a struggle for survival against aggressive state policies and outright threats of extermination; in this case terrorist means might be used to keep parity or balance of power (most prominently by the LTTE's Black Tiger squad of suicide bombers in Sri Lanka; contrary to Islamist-Jihadist forms of suicide bombing the Black Tigers are not motivated by religion and were generally more effective). Possibilities for conflict resolution range from concessions regarding cultural autonomy and diverse degrees of autonomy to (con-) federal solutions and sovereign statehood.
- C. Interstate conflicts, State versus State (SvS):** Earlier seen as the “classic type” of warfare. Cases: war at the Persian Gulf between Iraq and Iran (1980–1988), the 11 Days War between Mali and Burkina Faso (1985), or the invasion of U.S. in Panamá (1989), repeated wars and clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000, with indirect war and invasion escalating in Somalia 2006-7, including U.S. bombing raids vs. supposed Islamists) as well as and more seriously so between India and Pakistan, escalating to a nuclear stand-off after A-bomb explosions by both India and Pakistan in May 1998 and missile tests ever since created regional tensions and insecurity in South Asia, which currently seem under control. The number is limited; according to the ECOR Register during the decade 1985–1994 there were only 12 cases (of 102 wars) but the intensity increased again since 2001. Application of the Geneva Conventions should be unproblematic, esp. in case of use of WMD, but is contested in unprecedented way by U.S. (attempting to legalize torture, establishing an international torture gulag, changing the definition of POWs, refusing ICRC controls, etc.). Coalitions or war alliances are not seldom and increased in recent years: multistate coalitions versus one state (MSvS); several states vs. several other states (MSvMS), e.g. as ‘Global War on Terrorism’, GWOT. This was the constellation in the classic World Wars; today it continues and again increased in intensity, e.g., U.S., Great Britain, and others vs. Iraq (1990–1991), sanctions officially from 1990 until May 2003, slicing-up in ‘no-fly zones’, until March 2003, new U.S.-U.K. led invasion, under false pretexts, with ongoing chaotic and most deadly occupation war, creating additional civil war and sectarianism in Iraq (since March 2003, which is currently the most deadliest conflict) and occupation war by USA-NATO in Afghanistan since Nov. 2001, ideologically following the 9-11 demolition of the WTC in New York, as part of GWOT. Israel's new attack on Lebanon in summer of 2006, with indirect U.S. support, on top of

ongoing aggression war vs. the Palestinian territories as well as internal war (Hamas vs. PLO). Besides the last, all latter wars used indiscriminate and strategic bombardments with various illegal and banned weapons of mass destruction, WMD, e.g. Uranium weapons (since 1991), cluster bombs and chemical weapons.

- D.** Decolonization wars of foreign-state occupations (FSO): There are still a few Afro-Asiatic cases: Western Sahara, East Timor, West Papua, and Palestine; Eritrea became a sovereign state in 1991–1992, followed by new war with Ethiopia 1998-2000 and ongoing clashes and tensions. Most examples of type D have a dominant ethnonational character. Because of its privileges in international law type D is different from type B, which is of decisive influence for a possible conflict resolution. Essentially former European colonial territories were occupied or annexed by non-European regional powers; the occupied peoples have a good case at the UN, ICJ or ICA.
- E.** Interethnic conflicts: Type E is, together with types B and D, part of the ethnic or ethnicized conflicts in a broad sense but is different concerning its actors and aims. They act according to particular collective (nonprivate) interests. The issues are manifold but usually sectarian and sectorial: mainly particular interests, tribalism, clan conflicts, chauvism, and narrow nationalism. Economic aspects play a role but cultural and political aspects dominate. As in B the militants use their own group as a recruiting and support base; actors are not forced to develop a war economy above normal levels. Such conflicts are often fought without a state actor taking part.
- F.** Gang wars: Nonstate actors (some mixed with criminal elements); two basic types: (1) gang wars linked with situations of state collapse or (2) by groups with a terrorist agenda. They act according to particular or even private interests. As for (1) economic aspects seem to be dominant and a particular

type of war economy is developed. Such gang wars are usually fought over valuable resources (diamonds, gold, precious stones, strategic metals, drugs, etc.), land, or control of markets. As for (2) this type of gang wars has a smaller number; it is fought over ideological reasons not mainly economic ones, esp. religious-political extremism and several form of sectarianism (Islamists, Hindi fundamentalists, White supremacist sects, etc.). Actors: in **type (1)** are village militias, demobilized soldiers, or mercenaries (*contras*, *re-contras*, *re-compas*), so-called “dead squads,” the Mafia, (drug) syndicates (e.g., in Columbia, the Andean states or in the Golden Triangle of SE Asia), professional groups (e.g., Garimpos vs. Indians in the Amazon), private armies of warlords (in Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, etc.), or big landowners (in Latin America vs. landless *campesinos*), or settlers or migrants vs. indigenous peoples (e.g., in mountain areas of Bangladesh, Tripura, and Assam; in the Kenyan Rift Valley, etc.). Actors: in **type (2)** are international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, acting potentially world-wide but on a massively over-estimated scale, since its creation by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), then led by an Islamist-minded general, in joint-venture with the CIA in the late 1980s, under the Carter administration in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda was originally a tool in under-cover warfare used against the left-wing Afghan regimes, last by Dr. Najib, which were to be destabilized but got propped up by USSR troops (with Carter’s security adviser Brzezinski much later bragging about it in Paris, claiming it were part of his plan to entrap and destroy the USSR). 1983-97 the ISI is said to have trained some 80,000 mujaheddin from dozens of countries for campaigns in Afghanistan and their respective home countries, e.g., in Soviet republics and in China, partly coordinated by Al-Qaeda (which means “the base”), later led by Bin Laden, who was among others used by U.S. to prop-up the Bosnian Muslim army with his mujaheddin. Both the USA and Pakistan

suffered their blow-backs for funding and co-opting terrorist gangs. Al-Qaeda allegedly mutated, turned against its masters, and in 2001 committed the 9-11 attack against U.S.A.

This is debated by scientists on the website Scholars for 9/11 Truth, since the official account violates the laws of physics and structural engineering.⁴ Auditioned on Feb. 1st, 2007 by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Brzezinski confirmed that the USA could organize attacks in their own territory; however, there is sufficient evidence (e.g. by Rashid) that al-Qaeda's components or allies formed an international network of militants; some continued to act nationally or locally, e.g. Chechen militants (taking hostages in hospitals in the Caucasus, a theater in Moscow, a school in Beslan, Ingushetia; bombing buildings, etc.), Uzbek IMU (attacks in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Waziristan), Uyghurs (bombing attacks in China), etc. Type F2 is not to be mistaken with ethnonationalist or antiregime guerrillas sometimes accused of using terrorist methods.

G. Genocide: State-organized mass murder and crimes against humanity characterized by the intention of the rulers to exterminate individuals belonging to a particular national, ethnic, "racial," or religious group, in whole or in part (according to the 1948 UN Genocide Convention). Genocide is the worst type of mass violence and has to be clearly distinguished from warfare. Targets and victims are civilians (non-combatants) including old people, children, and even babies.

Genocide as the Worst Crime

The following list does not include **genocidal "strategic", deliberate bombing campaigns** directed against civilian populations during aggression wars, causing the death of tens of millions ever since WW2, mainly in the two Koreas during the 1950s, Indochina (Vietnam,

Laos and Cambodia) in the 1960s until 1975, the wars against Iraq since 1991, Yugoslavia in 1999 and Afghanistan since 2001.

The seven recent cases of **large-scale genocide** were all extermination cases committed chiefly by states and aided by various other actors.

- (1) Indonesia, under complicity of USA, committed genocide and politicide against over a million of PKI members and ethnic minorities in the mid 1960s.
- (2) The Indonesian army, again from 1975 until 1999, committed genocide against the East Timorese, killing a third of the population.
- (3) Prepared by U.S. mass bombardments, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, during 1975–1979, exterminated Cham, Chinese and the large Vietnamese minorities; mass murder was also committed against ethnic Khmer ("auto-genocide"), killing almost two million.
- (4) In Iraq, ever since Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the most comprehensive cut-off sanctions ever imposed by the United Nations, and manipulated by U.S.-U.K. for 14 years (until formally lifted in May 2003, after the U.S.-U.K. led invasion of Iraq, according to U.N. leaders and various medical inquiries, resulted in large-scale genocide against the most vulnerable sections of the Iraqi civilian population, killing two millions of babies and children under 5, with additional mass morbidity and mortality among children over 5, women, the sick and the elderly, mainly from among Iraq's impoverished classes, with ongoing and vastly increased effect, caused by military invasion, occupation, and subsequent civil war and slaughter until today.
- (5) Rwanda's Hutu power regime overkilled almost the entire Tutsi branch of the Banyarwanda, within 100 days (April 7 to July 15, 1994), murdering one million; massacres had been repeatedly committed against Tutsi since 1959 and against two small minorities (Gogwe and Hima).
- (6) Genocidal violence of large-proportions with up to four million victims each in cumulative counts also characterized both largest conflicts in Africa, ravaging Congo-

⁴ See at <http://www.st911.org/>.

Zaire 1997–2002, with ongoing violence in the Kivus, Ituri and Katanga, and (7) genocidal intra-state mass violence in Sudan. Since the 1989 Sudan's Islamist-militarist NIF regime, led by putchist general al-Bashir, has committed outright genocide against Dinka civilians and other Nilotic groups in Southern Sudan as well as the Nuba of Central Sudan.⁵ Enabled by peace negotiations with SPLA and a so-called Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the South, consolidated by the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Southern Sudan, aggression continued since 2003 in Darfur, Western Sudan, as genocidal mass violence against the three black African Muslim peoples of Fur, Maasalit and Zaghawa, causing a death toll of up to 400,000 unarmed civilians and 2.5 million IDPs and refugees. Genocidal mass violence continued despite a PKO sent by the African Union to Darfur—and a hybrid UN-AU force decided by the UN Security Council but since 2006 blocked and not deployed under various pretexts—resulting in a large-scale humanitarian disaster and additional **regional destabilization** (Chad and Central African Republic) by state-sponsored Arab militias.⁶

The most deadly component in the above listed seven cases has been **genocide by attrition**.⁷

Summary of Classification, Indexes and Trends in Contemporary Mass Violence

Short 7-Type Classification of Mass Violence

The ECOR world conflict index is based on a 7-type classification of mass violence:

⁵ War as smokescreen for genocide against black African peoples had already started since 1956, interrupted by autonomy (1972–78), by the Arab-Nubian led North Sudanese army, under various regimes (among them also elected ones) with support of mobilized and armed Arab militias for decades, giving them opportunities to loot, destroy, rape and enslave.

⁶ Arab militias were drawn from North Darfur and Kordofan.

⁷ Genocide by attrition has been historically been the most pervasive and common form of mass killing during the last 500 years, starting with the largest-ever genocide of European colonial powers and settlers vs. the indigenous Americans.

- A. Anti-regime-wars, political conflicts; state versus insurgents
- B. Ethno-nationalist conflicts, mostly as intra-state conflicts (state versus nation), often cross-border or spill-over effects
- C. Interstate conflicts, state versus state, seen as 'classic wars'
- D. Decolonisation wars or Foreign State Occupations
- E. Inter-ethnic conflicts, mainly non-state actors (exclusively so in communal conflicts)
- F. Gang wars, non-state actors (warlords, religious extremists and terrorists, mixed with organised criminal elements), esp. in situations of state failure or state collapse
- G. Genocide, state-organised, mass murder and major crimes.

The heterogeneous dynamic character of contemporary violent conflicts must be grasped adequately. ECOR index addressed this as such: besides pointing at a dominant type, secondary and tertiary components were codified.

World Conflict Index (as PP)

[To understand the PowerPoint presentation with the **world conflict index** please keep this page open; it helps you to understand the index.]

The 7 Trends in Recent Contemporary

Mass Violence

Two trends were mentioned in the last lectures (see <http://www.intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/~hyoshida/2007/2007-1/070613.pdf>). These were:

- (1) Complex Crisis, State Crimes and State Collapse
- (2) Creation of Terrorism by States and Use of Terrorist Methods by States

Today we are looking at the following trends:

- (3) Reduction of Inter-State Wars and the Increase of Foreign Interventions
- (4) Regional Distribution of Conflicts: Decrease in Asia versus Increase in Africa
- (5) Unchecked Most Deadly Episodes—almost Unknown to the General Public
- (6) The Return of War and Slaughter to Europe
- (7) Renewed Neo-Imperialist Aggression since 1994 until today